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This study investigates the environmental impact
of a government subsidy program for crop
insurance in China. It looks at how crop
insurance scheme in Xinjiang province affects
the way cotton farmers use fertilizers, pesticides
and plastic agro-film. These three inputs cause
significant environmental problems in the region
and there is a need to ensure that their over-use is
not encouraged. 
 
The study finds that crop insurance helps protect
farmers from the economic impact of crop
failures, with a minimal negative impact on the
environment.  The only significant impact is a
potential slight increase in agro-film use. In fact,
crop insurance helps reduce the amount of
pesticides cotton growers use.  In light of these
findings, the study concludes that a government-
subsidized crop insurance program is an
acceptable policy and proposes a number of ideas
for minimizing any residual environmental
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CROP INSURANCE AND AGROCHEMICAL USE IN THE                                    
MANASI WATERSHED, XINJIANG, CHINA 
 





The Chinese agricultural sector is characterized by two factors: 1) China has to feed 
22% of the world’s population with only 7% of the world’s arable land; 2) farmers still 
account for roughly half of the country’s workforce to date. As a result, the average size of 
a Chinese farm is about 0.6 hectares, and many farmers are working on poor land, facing 
low and unstable yields and incomes. Integration into the world market brings further 
pressure on farm prices, making farmers’ lives even more difficult and government help 
more essential. Yet, policy choices are restricted by established bilateral and/or multilateral 
agreements. In searching for appropriate policy tools, government subsidies for crop 
insurance have been advocated as a policy alternative to support agricultural growth and 
farmers’ incomes in China since the country joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The arguments of the advocates are: 1) a crop insurance program will provide more stable 
incomes to farmers through indemnity payments (compensation) for crop failures; 2) 
government-subsidized insurance premiums for farmers will expand crop insurance 
coverage, helping more farmers; and 3) government subsidies for crop insurance are 
permitted by WTO rules. Therefore, they believe that a government subsidy for crop 
insurance is a good policy choice to help farmers and the agricultural sector. However, 
cautions have been raised as a crop insurance program may impact the environment 
negatively through increases in agrochemical use. This study explores farmers’ behaviors 
with regard to agrochemical use under the current crop insurance scheme in order to 
identify if and to what extent participation in crop insurance has influenced the application 
of agrochemicals.  
The research team collected farm household data from the Manasi Watershed, 
Xinjiang, where crop insurance has been bought by farmers for nearly two decades, and 
applied that data to a simultaneous equation system consisting of disaggregated input 
models. It was found that the decisions on fertilizer, pesticide and agrofilm applications did 
have different impacts on crop insurance participation, and were influenced by the latter in 
different ways. While agrofilm application is increased if the farmer purchases crop 
insurance, the application of pesticides is reduced. The application of chemical fertilizers 
increases as well, but the increase is not statistically significant. 
The results imply that a government-subsidized crop insurance program is an 
acceptable policy alternative. If the government chooses to subsidize crop insurance, the 
subsidy will reduce the premium payment and hence encourage more farmers to participate 
in a crop insurance program. Under the current low-premium and low-indemnity policy, a 
crop insurance program is not likely to induce significant increases in agrochemical use. As 
a result, the expansion of the program will benefit a larger portion of farmers without 






1.0 INTRODUCTION  
1.1   Problem Statement 
The vulnerability of the agricultural sector in China due to lack of economies of scale, 
especially for bulk commodities, has become a hot topic after the country joined the WTO 
in 2002. Restricted by prohibitions against price and export subsidies, alternative policy 
measures to support domestic agriculture have been sought by the Chinese government in 
accordance with WTO rules. Budget subsidies for crop insurance, as one of the “Green 
Box” measures 1 , have been advocated in expectation of stimulating production and 
providing more stable and higher expected income to farmers. However, as some previous 
studies have shown, crop insurance can encourage the application of agrochemicals and 
hence bring about negative impacts on the environment and jeopardize the future growth of 
agriculture. If this happens, the outcome of subsidizing crop insurance may contradict its 
policy goals in the long run. It is obvious that the potential environmental impact of crop 
insurance depends on farmers’ decisions with regard to agrochemical application under 
current social, economic, and environmental conditions. This study tries to explore if 
farmers’ decisions in favour of crop insurance participation is made simultaneously with 
those of agrochemical application, and if so, to what extent such decisions may impact the 
environment. 
China, with a population of over 1.3 billion people and a cultivated land base of 130 
million hectares, has been able to supply enough food for its growing population in spite of 
its limited cultivated land endowment. (Cultivated land per capita in China is about one-
third of the world’s average.) This accomplishment was achieved primarily by increasing 
the use of modern inputs and advances in agricultural technology. One of the key 
ingredients in increased agricultural production has been intensive farming on small-scale 
arable land, implying a corresponding increase in the application of agrochemical inputs, 
such as chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and so on (Huang et al. 2002). 
    The intensification of agriculture has greatly enhanced agricultural productivity. 
However, it has created serious problems of environmental degradation at the same time. 
Leaching of nitrates, pesticides and other agrochemicals into groundwater; and surface 
water pollution from soil erosion and nutrients and pesticides runoff have been frequently 
reported in China and have been found to be linked to intensified farming practice in many 
cases. Facing continuing deterioration of the quality of the rural environment and 
agricultural resource base, considerable attention has been given to the environmental 
effects of government agricultural policies that may encourage the greater use of chemical 
inputs in agricultural production. 
As a consequence of joining the WTO, China may turn to more “Green Box” 
measures including subsidizing crop insurance. (There was no government subsidy for crop 
insurance yet, at the time of our study in 2005, but it has been advocated by many.). The 
                                                 
1  In WTO terminology, subsidies in general are identified by “boxes” which are given the colours of traffic 
lights: green (permitted), amber (slow down — i.e. reduced), and red (forbidden). Green box subsidies must 
not distort trade, or at most, cause minimal distortion. They have to be government-funded (not funded by 
charging consumers higher prices) and must not involve price support (government administered prices, 






government now intends to encourage the development of crop insurance programs to cover 
more crops over larger areas, and to provide subsidies as an alternative policy instrument 
for supporting agriculture. However, any crop insurance program which affects crop 
production is likely to influence agrochemical use and thereby, has certain environmental 
impacts (Leathers and Quiggin 1991). There has been increasing agreement that crop 
insurance programs could potentially influence the environment through changes in 
agrochemical use (Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993). It seems likely that crop insurance, 
which is aimed specifically at averting risks, could affect environmental quality through 
direct changes in input use decisions on existing crop land, and indirectly through changes 
in cropping patterns. 
Though still not popular, crop insurance programs have been practiced in China for 
decades, especially in cotton production in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Due 
to the fragile nature of the environment in Xinjiang and the whole northwestern China, a 
thorough study of the relationship between crop insurance and agrochemical usage under 
current circumstances is essential to encourage the designing of an environmental-friendly 
insurance policy through a specific subsidy scheme, and for the government to make a 
better overall policy package in general. 
1.2    Issues and Significance of the Research 
With China entering into the WTO, both policy-makers and relevant interested groups 
such as economists and environmentalists, are looking for alternative mechanisms to protect 
farmers' incomes and the environment simultaneously. One often suggested mechanism is 
crop insurance. From a policy perspective, the issue of interest is the effect of crop 
insurance coverage on the use of chemical inputs, such as fertilizers, that affect 
environmental quality. How input decisions change under crop insurance schemes attracts 
increasing attention as it relates to the policy decision as to whether the government should 
subsidize crop insurance or leave farmers to rely on commercial schemes for crop 
insurance. If the application of chemicals increases under insurance, as suggested by 
Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993), then it is likely that an insurance subsidy as a substitute 
for direct government payments will increase agricultural pollution. However, if chemicals 
use declines significantly under insurance, as concluded by Smith and Goodwin (1996), 
Quiggin, Karagiannis and Stanton (1993), and Babcock and Hennessy (1996), the 
environment may benefit from subsidized insurance programs. 
As might be expected, the relationship between crop insurance participation and 
agrochemical application is likely to depend on the actual design of the insurance policy. 
Therefore, an empirical study on existing crop insurance programs is required to estimate 
their nature under current conditions. Although some provinces have begun to offer their 
own crop insurance programs to avert production risk in China, the China United Property 
Insurance Company (CUPIC) (formerly known as Xinjiang Corps Insurance Company) in 
the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, is the only one which has provided crop 
insurance programs for almost 20 years.  The insurance coverage of crop production inside 
the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XJPCC) has increased significantly in 
recent years, from 6.65% in 1986 to 83.56% by 2003 (CUPIC, 2004). However, with the 
increasing coverage of crop insurance, the environmental implications of this policy, such 






relationship between crop insurance purchase and agrochemical use decisions in a sample 
of cotton producers in the Manasi Watershed of Xinjiang, with a population of about 0.8 
million and an area of approximately 20,000 km2. 
This study will seek answers to the following questions: 
1.  Do farmers' crop insurance purchases affect their decision on the type of chemical input 
used i.e., fertilizers, pesticides or agrofilm, and if so, how significant are the effects on 
the environment? 
2.  What factors influence farmers' crop insurance purchases and their decisions on 
agrochemical inputs?  
3.  What are the environmental and political implications of the effects of crop insurance? 
It is believed that answers to these questions will help provide policy-makers with 
solid evidence on whether subsidizing crop insurance is an appropriate policy measure in 
supporting agriculture and farmers’ incomes, or whether negative impacts will result. In 
addition, it is hoped that the findings of this study will provide further insights into farmers’ 
decision-making processes and a better understanding of farmers’ production behavior in 
general. 
1.3   Objectives and Hypotheses of the Study 
The primary objective of this study is to increase the understanding of the effects of 
the current crop insurance policy on chemical use along the Manasi Watershed in terms of 
the direction and magnitude of such impacts on agricultural non-point source pollution, and 
to discover the leading implications of such a relationship.  
Specific objectives are:  
1. To identify the factors that affect fertilizer, pesticide and agrofilm input decisions by 
voluntarily insured and uninsured farmers in the Manasi Watershed; 
2. To examine the factors that affect the watershed farmers' crop insurance purchase 
decisions; and 
3. To provide rough estimates of the relationship between each kind of chemical input and 
crop insurance purchase decisions from a sample of cotton farmers in the Manasi 
Watershed. 
The research aims to test the following hypotheses: 
1. A farmer's decision to purchase crop insurance is made simultaneously with that to use 
agro-chemical inputs; and 
2. A farmer's decision to purchase crop insurance and use chemical inputs is either 






 There are a number of economic and demographic variables influencing farmers’ 
decisions. For example, if the crop is the major source of income and the yield fluctuates 
significantly, the farmer is more likely to participate in a crop insurance program. On the 
other hand, if the farmer is more experienced and/or has a larger portion of income from 
other sources, he is not likely to participate in such a program so as to avoid the cost 
(insurance premium). The hypothesized relationships between these variables and farmers’ 
decisions are given in the model in Chapter 4.  
1.4   Scope of the Research  
The empirical research was conducted in the Manasi Watershed, Xinjiang, for 
practical reasons. Firstly, Xinjiang is one of the most important cotton-producing bases in 
China, and the Manasi Watershed is one of the three main cotton-producing areas in 
Xinjiang. Located at the center of Eurasia, the watershed is characterized by insufficient 
rainfall, drought and high evaporation since it is far away from the ocean. With a large land 
area, small population and infertile soil, agriculture here relies heavily on chemical 
fertilizers and other agro-chemicals, and cotton production uses chemicals more intensively 
compared with other commodity crops. Therefore, increasing attention has been paid to the 
environmental problems in this watershed. Secondly, farmers have been provided with crop 
insurance programs for 18 years here. The increased participation rate indicates that farmers 
are getting familiar with the real costs and benefits of crop insurance and hence are likely to 
take these into consideration when making production decisions. 
The data used in this study came from both primary and secondary data sources. The 
primary data used to determine fertilizer, agrofilm and pesticide2 use and crop insurance 
purchases at the individual level were collected from a sample of farm households. The 
survey was conducted in the Manasi Watershed (Manasi County, Shawan County, and the 
No. 8 Agro-Division and the No. 6 Agro-Division of the XJPCC).3 Four hundred and fifty 
cotton farmers were randomly selected from the Manasi Watershed and 340 effective 
samples were used in the study. 
The secondary data came from various official statistical publications and a variety of 
literature published in China. Information was gathered on agricultural production, 
utilization of agrochemical inputs, the current environmental situation, and agriculture 
insurance programs at various administrative levels (village, county, and province). 
                                                 
2 The term ‘pesticides’ used in this research includes germicides, herbicides, and insecticides. 
3 The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corporation (XJPCC) was established in the 1950s as a semi-
military unit, performing multi-roles such as organizing agricultural and industrial production, commerce and 
service, infrastructure construction and maintenance, and providing government administration, education, 
health care, etc., as well as supporting government armed forces in guarding the border. Its internal 
administration system was vertical under the planned economy (before the reform). There were 10 divisions 
under the XJPCC, and each division was divided into about 15 regiments. The function of the XJPCC has 
gradually changed towards a commercial enterprise in the last two decades. During the transformation, the 
regiment was renamed ‘Tuanchang’ to reduce its original military image, with each Tuanchang consisting of a 






1.5   A Brief Summary of the Findings 
The findings of this study confirm that the decisions on crop insurance purchase and 
agrochemical applications are most likely made simultaneously by cotton producers in the 
Manasi Watershed, Xinjiang. Farmers who apply more chemical fertilizers and agrofilm4 
are more likely to participate in crop insurance programs while those who apply more 
pesticides will do the opposite. At the same time, farmers who participate in crop insurance 
programs are likely to apply more agrofilm, and fertilizers, but less pesticides. 
The findings also imply that environmental impacts are likely to be quite limited if the 
government subsidy does not dramatically change the terms currently stipulated in the crop 
insurance policy. Under the current crop insurance policy in our study area, a farmer who 
participates in an insurance program for cotton is entitled to receive an indemnity only if 
the actual yield is below 50% of the normal level, and the indemnity is no more than RMB 
260 per mu or 40% of the production costs incurred. A low-indemnity policy is associated 
with low-premium: in order to participate in the crop insurance program, a farmer needs to 
pay only RMB 20 for each mu (about US$ 37 per hectare). Such a low-premium and low-
indemnity policy is not likely to encourage farmers to increase agrochemical use. 
According to our study, insured farmers will increase application of agrofilm by 5% 
compared with those uninsured, while the increase in fertilizer application is insignificant 
and the application of pesticides is actually reduced.  
 Therefore, a government subsidy for crop insurance is likely to be an appropriate 
policy measure in supporting agriculture and farmers’ incomes with China joining the 
WTO. Nevertheless, some remedies are suggested to counter the potential threats of the 
accumulated agrofilm residuals in the environment. 
1.6   Organization of the Report 
This introduction section is followed by a brief literature review. Section 3 provides 
the background of the study, including resources, cotton production, environmental issues 
and current practices in crop insurance in the Manasi Watershed. Section 4 describes the 
analytical framework and econometric models used in this research, and the empirical 
results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the findings 
and implications, and provides brief policy recommendations. 
 
2.0   LITERATURE REVIEW 
Concerns about the potential impact of agricultural production on environmental 
quality have become prominent in policy discussions and environmental/economic 
literature. A number of theoretical and empirical studies have been conducted to analyze the 
impact of crop insurance on input use (for instance, Quiggin 1992; Ramaswami 1993; 
                                                 
4 Agrofilm is a kind of plastic film, widely used by farmers in drought and cold areas, to cover the field before 
sowing and/or during the growing season. It keeps in soil moisture and raises soil temperature. However, the 
small broken pieces can remain in the soil for decades, becoming a kind of pollutant and threatening the 






Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993; Smith and Goodwin 1996; and Babcock and Hennessy 
1996). Several empirical studies have estimated the intensive-margin effects of crop 
insurance on input use but have reached contradictory conclusions. The main reason is that 
production conditions (for example, climate and rainfall) and the parameters of crop 
insurance programs (i.e. coverage, indemnity and premium levels) are heterogeneous across 
regions and crops, and the assumptions of farmers’ decision-making processes are different 
i.e., simultaneous or recursive. Some researchers argue that crop insurance purchase will 
have an impact on farmers’ chemical input decisions but that chemical input decisions will 
not have an impact on the crop insurance purchase decision. That is to say, farmers make 
the decision to purchase crop insurance first and independently, and then decide their 
agrochemical uses accordingly. As the decision on agrochemical use depends on if the 
farmer purchases crop insurance but not vice versa, this decision-making process is known 
as recursive. On the contrary, others believe that farmers’ decisions on crop insurance 
affects chemical inputs and vice versa, i.e., the two decisions are inter-dependent – this 
decision-making process is called simultaneous. 
Smith and Goodwin (1996), in an econometric analysis on wheat farms in Kansas in 
which insurance and input decisions were determined simultaneously, concluded that 
nitrogen fertilizer expenditures decreased by US$ 5.00/acre with crop insurance. Their 
empirical results are in accord with more conventional views about the effects of insurance 
on input use. In a similar analysis, Quiggin, Karagiannis and Stanton (1993) concluded that 
Midwest corn and soybean farmers who purchased crop insurance decreased chemical 
applications by about 10%.  
In contrast, Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) found that the purchase of crop 
insurance induced Midwestern corn farmers to increase their fertilizer applications by 
approximately 19% and pesticide expenditures by 21%. This relationship reflected a 
recursive structure in which the crop insurance decision influenced input use (but input use 
did not influence the crop insurance decision) on the assumptions that farmers were risk 
averse, that increased applications of fertilizer and pesticides raised the probability of low 
(below expected average) yields, and that the crop insurance decision had to be made 
before any inputs were actually applied.  
With increased applications of fertilizers, expected yields will increase. At the same 
time, the probability of both low and high yields will increase as well meaning that the 
fluctuations in yield will become greater. Without crop insurance, farmers may not find 
increasing inputs desirable as the benefit of a higher expected yield will be offset by greater 
fluctuation (risk). However, if the insurance indemnity covers part of the loss when yield 
fluctuates downwards, the farmer who purchases crop insurance may want to increase 
agrochemical use in order to capture a high yield and return. This is the rationale behind the 
potential relationship between crop insurance and agrochemical use. In our case, because 
the amount of indemnity is small and the probability of receiving it is low, farmers who 
purchase crop insurance basically want to avoid the worst-case crop failure and not try to 
maximize their expected returns.  
Models developed by Smith and Goodwin (1996) and Horowitz and Lichtenberg 
(1993) postulate that fertilizers and other chemical inputs have two distinct effects on yield 






yields as well as the variance of yields. To the extent that the effect of the increased 
variance may be large enough to offset the increase in expected yields, additional chemical 
inputs may actually raise the probability of low yields. If the losses due to low yields could 
be indemnified by insurance, farmers may wish to increase their application of chemical 
inputs. In this case, they will enjoy higher incomes when yields are high while getting 
indemnity from crop insurance if the yields turn out to be low. Theoretically, therefore, 
insurance (which reduces the exposure to risk) has an ambiguous effect on chemical 
application rates, including fertilizers, pesticides and agrofilms, depending on the actual 
characteristics of the insurance programs.  
However, it is widely accepted that pesticides do not increase yield potential but may 
reduce the probability of low yields caused by disease and pests, i.e., reduce low-end yield 
fluctuations. They only reduce the probability and extent of losses from low yields when 
damaging agents such as insects and pests are present (Lichtenberg and Zilberman 1986). 
Thus, the increased application of pesticides should result in a decreased probability of low 
yields, which suggests that a farmer who insures against low yields should decrease, not 
increase, pesticide use (Babcock and Hennessy 1996). As the purpose of purchasing crop 
insurance and applying pesticides are both to reduce the probability obtaining low returns, 
they may substitute for each other. Therefore, a farmer who decides to purchase crop 
insurance may reduce pesticide application; and a farmer who intends to apply more 
pesticides may not want to purchase crop insurance. As Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) 
point out, fertilizers must be applied at levels that do not adversely impact the yield when 
growing conditions are bad, for example, nitrogen fertilizers are widely known to cause 
burning and reduction of yields when there is low rainfall. However, such fertilizers also 
increase yields when growing conditions are favorable. So, the idea is that as a result of 
moral hazard5, the likelihood that the purchase of crop insurance will encourage the use of 
more chemical inputs seems low.  
Babcock and Hennessy (1996), in a Monte Carlo analysis of crop insurance for Iowa 
farmers, found that crop insurance schemes were likely to lead to relatively minor 
reductions in the applications of nitrogen fertilizers if coverage levels were at or below 70% 
of the mean yield. If the coverage level was 90%, a farmer with a high risk aversion will 
reduce his fertilizer application rate by 10%. Their findings imply that not only risk 
attitudes, but also the degree of crop insurance coverage influenced the average per acre 
chemical use dramatically. 
A careful comparison of these previous studies suggests that the relationship between 
crop insurance participation and agrochemical input application depends on farmers’ 
decision-making behavior, production conditions, and the terms of the crop insurance 
program. Therefore, whether any specific crop insurance program has or does not have a 
negative environmental impact in specific locations is a problem that requires empirical 
investigation. However, such empirical investigations will provide insights into farmers’ 
behavior, especially with production decision-making, and useful information in designing 
environment-friendly crop insurance policies and programs.  
                                                 
5 Moral hazard arises when input use is altered due to asymmetric information and incompatible incentives 






3.0  BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH 
3.1   Resources and Cotton Production 
The Manasi Watershed of Xinjiang was chosen for this research for two reasons. 
Firstly, any empirical research requires relevant data and Xinjiang is the only place where 
crop insurance has been available to cotton producers for almost two decades. Secondly, the 
natural conditions for agricultural production are extremely unfavorable in Xinjiang 
compared with most other regions in China, making it an ideal place for testing if crop 
insurance programs have negative impacts on the environment. If a crop insurance program 
benefits farmers in this region without damaging the environment, it is  quite likely to do 
the same in other regions of China. 
Xinjiang is the largest inland province6 in northwest China, but it has limited natural 
resources and harsh conditions for agricultural production. While the total land area is 1.66 
million km2, accounting for 16.67% of the nation’s total land area, the cultivated land in 
Xinjiang covers 4.12 million hectares, accounting for only 3.17% of the national total. 
More than 60% of land there is classified as mountains, deserts or saline-alkaline soils, 
while only 4.47% of the land surface there is under cultivation, less than 20% of the 
national average. This indicates the fragile nature of Xinjiang’s environment. The forest 
coverage percentage of land area is only 1.9%, also far below the national average of 
16.55%. (See Table 3.1 for details.) 
 
Table 3.1   Cultivated and Crop Sown Areas in Xinjiang and China (2002) 




Crop sown area 
(million ha) 
Forest coverage rate 
percentage 
(%) 
Xinjiang 1664.9 3.99 3.48 1.9 
China 9600 130.04 154.64 16.55 
Sources: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook (2003); China Statistical Yearbook (2003)  
Note: ‘Cultivated land’ is classified as the land primarily used to grow crops while ‘crop sown area’ is the 
actual area of cultivated land covered by crops in a certain time period, usually a year in statistics. If a part of 
the cultivated land is left untended, the sown area is less than the cultivated area. If part or all of the cultivated 
land is used to grow two or more crops a year, the sown area will be greater than the cultivated one. This is 
why the sown area is less than the cultivated area in Xinjiang, but greater for the nation as a whole because 
multi-cropping is practiced in many parts of China. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Actually it is named Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region with the same administrative status as a province. 
As a minority autonomous region (a kind of administrative unit in China where minority races make up the 






A more severe problem than the harsh terrain is fresh water supply. The annual 
precipitation is only about 150 mm in Xinjiang, compared with the national average of 630 
mm, and a large portion of the precipitation falls onto mountains instead farmlands. In 
contrast, the evaporation in Xinjiang is very high, ranging from 1,500 to 3,000 mm 
annually. Although there are about 320 rivers in Xinjiang, most of them are short inland 
rivers with melted ice and snow from the high mountains as their sole water source. Almost 
no surface water flows in from outside Xinjiang as it is surrounded by mountains. It has 
been well recognized that the acreage of cultivated land in Xinjiang depends on water 
supply, and that the total water supply there is limited due to climate and topographical 
conditions. Groundwater is widely used in northern Xinjiang, often making existing 
problems such as salination worse, in addition to falling levels of the groundwater itself. 
As in most regions in China, crops in Xinjiang comprise the most important sub-sector 
in agriculture (which also includes animal husbandry, fishery and forestry in China), 
contributing to about 70% to the total value output of the country’s agriculture. However, 
cotton is very important in Xinjiang. As a high-quality cotton producer, Xinjiang is one of 
the most important cotton-producing bases in China today. The cotton sown areas increased 
very rapidly from 181.22 thousand hectares in 1980 to 943.97 thousand hectares by 2002, 
while the output increased from 79.2 thousand (metric) tonnes to 1,477 thousand tonnes 
during the same time period (See Table 3.2 for details.). As a result, Xinjiang’s shares in 
cotton sown area and output rose to 22.56% and 30.51%, respectively, of the national totals 
in 2002. 
 
Table  3.2  Cotton Production in Xinjiang and China 
 Sown areas (‘000 hectares) Output (‘000 tonnes) 
 China Xinjiang Xinjiang’s share (%) China Xinjiang 
Xinjiang’s 
share (%) 
1980 4920 181.22 3.68 2707 79.2 2.93 
1985 5141 253.52 4.93 4147 187.8 4.53 
1990 5588 435.22 7.78 4508 468.8 10.40 
1995 5422 742.99 13.70 4768 935.0 19.61 
2000 4041 1012.39 25.53 4417 1500.0 33.96 
2002 4184 943.97 22.56 4916 1477.0 30.51 
Source: Calculated by authors using data from the Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook (2003) and the Rural 
Statistical Yearbooks of China (1987, 2002 & 2003)  
The XJPCC was established in the 1950s as a semi-military unit, performing multi-
roles such as organizing agricultural and industrial production; commerce and service; 






education, health care, etc., as well as supporting formal armed forces in guarding the 
border. Its internal administration system was vertically structured under the former 
centrally planned economy. Following the economic reform which started in 1978 in China, 
the XJPCC gradually shifted to a profit-making organization with a decreasing role in 
government functions, and decision-making has been slowly decentralized as well. 
The XJPCC is, however, still a big agricultural producer. There are currently 14 
divisions under the XJPCC, and each division is divided into about 15 regiments 
(‘regiment’ has been renamed ‘Tuanchang’) with each consisting of a total population of 
roughly 20,000 people including about 10,000 farmers, and of arable lands of 
approximately 160 thousand mu.7 The cultivated land under the XJPCC increased from 
77.3 thousand hectares in 1954 to 1,057.08 thousand hectares in 2002, accounting for 
26.5% of the provincial total. Per capital of cultivated land is 1.55 hectares within the 
XJPCC, much higher than the provincial average of roughly 0.2 hectares and the national 
average of 0.1 hectare (XJPCC 2003).8  
Cotton has become a dominant crop in the XJPCC since the early 1980s, with sown 
areas increasing from 65.09 thousand hectares in 1980 to 453.59 thousand hectares by 
2002. Cotton’s share of the total crop area is above 40% within the XJPCC, much greater 
than the provincial average of 27% and national average of less than 3%.  
Because farmers inside the XJPCC may still be under a strong administrative influence 
when making production decisions, a larger region covering both the XJPCC and ordinary 
villages with similar production conditions, is desired. As stated earlier, the Manasi 
Watershed is a specific region consisting of Manasi County, Shawan County, the No. 8 
Agro-Division and the No. 6 Agro-Division. Manasi County and Shawan County are home 
to ordinary rural communities, while the No. 8 and No. 6 Agro-Divisions belong to the 
XJPCC. The Manasi Watershed was selected for the field survey because cotton is the most 
important crop here (cotton is the major source of income for farmers in Xinjiang) and the 
crop insurance program used here has been for cotton production over the last 20 years. 
Also the Manasi River is an inland river, the protection of which has become an important 
environmental policy issue. The watershed in northern Xinjiang spreads across Manasi 
County, Shawan County, Shihezi Township, Shihezi City, 18 Tuanchangs under the No. 8 
Agro-Division, and Xinhu Tuanchang under the No. 6 Agro-Division. Cotton is the major 
crop, accounting for 40-70% of total crop sown area here.  
The annual precipitation in this watershed ranges from 85.7 to 272.4 mm (based on 
1991 to 2003 statistics) and from 63.9 to 187.1 mm in the growing season from April to 
September. This is not enough for cotton production. So, agrofilm has played an 
increasingly important role in protecting the humidity of surface soil from evaporation in 
order to ensure healthy growth of the crops at the early growing stage. As clearing up the 
used and broken pieces of agrofilm after harvest is very costly and time-consuming, it has 
been left to accumulate in the soil, presenting a serious threat to the environment. 
                                                 
7 1 hectare = 15 mu  
8 The XJPCC is one part of the Xinjiang Autonomous  Region. The administrative system in the XJPCC is 
different from other local governments in Xinjiang, so all the data relating to the XJPCC comes from the 






Remaining in the soil for decades before dissolving, the little pieces of agrofilm can hamper 
the growth of seedling and/or roots of crops with small seeds.    
3.2   Agrochemical Inputs and Environmental Problems 
As shown in Table 3.3, total fertilizer application increased from 122 thousand tonnes 
in 1980 to 843 thousand tonnes in 2002 in Xinjiang, representing an annual growth rate of 
17.5%. Although chemical fertilizer application per hectare of crop-sown area in Xinjiang 
was still below the national average in 2003 (256.58 kg/ha versus 289.45 kg/ha 
respectively), its average growth rate (8.32%) was faster compared with the national 
average (3.46%) during the time period. As a result, it increased from below 50% of the 
national average in 1980 to over 85% of the national average in 2003. 9 (See Table 3.3 for 
details). 
  









1980 122 40.75 86.72 
1985 203 71.31 123.64 
1990 395 132.44 174.59 
1995 678 222.06 239.77 
2000 792 233.57 265.28 
2002 843 242.36 280.61 
2003 907 256.58 289.45 
Sources: Calculated from the Xinjiang Statistical Yearbooks (1999-2002); Xinjiang Huihuang 50 Years: 
1949-1999; and Rural Statistical Yearbooks of China (2000-2004) 
Note:  Data in this table was calculated on 100% effective component bases. For example, different types of 
nitrogenous fertilizer contain different percentages of the effective content, i.e., nitrogen. In order to measure 
and compare application levels with those for other crops, areas, and/or years, the quantity must be converted 
to the same effective component, usually 100%. 
 
To a large extent, the fast growth of chemical fertilizer application in Xinjiang can be 
attributed to the fast growing and highly concentrated cotton production in the region. 
Cotton production requires relatively larger quantity of chemical fertilizers compared with 
most bulk crops (crops grown on a large scale, such as major grain crops). The average 
expenditure on chemical fertilizers for cotton increased rapidly in Xinjiang, from RMB10 
2.51 per mu in 1980 to 145.56 RMB per mu in 2003, with the peak level of RMB 172.36 
per mu in 1998. Figure 3.1 shows that the average expenditure on chemical fertilizers per 
                                                 
9 There is a lag of 2-3 years in the publication of statistics in China. For example, the Statistical Yearbook for 
2005 will be published in November 2006 and will contain data up to 2004, so the most recent published data 
for this report is 2003.  






mu of cotton sown area in Xinjiang has been significantly greater than that of the national 
average since 1996.   
As described earlier, agrofilm application is widely used in Xinjiang. It increased from 
26.5 thousand tonnes in 1990 to 104.7 thousand tonnes in 2001, with a per hectare 
application rate well above the national average. The pesticides application level in 
Xinjiang was still below 50% of the national average in 2001. However, it also increased 
relatively faster, from 1.7 kg/ha in 1990 to 3.7 kg/ha in 2001, or by 117% in 11 years as 
compared with only a 65% increase in the national average during the same time period. 
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Figure 3.1 Expenditure on Chemical Fertilizers per mu of Cotton in Xinjiang and China 
Source: Agricultural Product Cost and Benefit Data Compiles of China (1981-2004) 
 
 
Table 3.4 Agrofilm and Pesticide Applications  
Agrofilm Pesticides 

















1990 26.5 8.91. 481.9 3.25 5.1 1.71 733 4.95 
1995 55.4 18.16 915.5 6.11 9.1 3.00 1087 7.26 
2000 88.1 26.01 1335.5 8.55 13.6 4.02 1280 8.19 
2001 104.7 30.76 1449.3 9.31 12.6 3.71 1275 8.19 








It is observed from Figure 3.1 that the fertilizer application level in cotton production 
has leveled off since the mid-1990s in Xinjiang and in China as a whole. This is consistent 
with our field investigation. The data collected from the No. 8 Agro-Division, one of our 
major research areas, indicates that applications of all three major agrochemical inputs (i.e., 
fertilizers, pesticides and agrofilm) increased quite rapidly in the first half of the 1990s, but 
more or less stabilized afterwards except in the year 2003. (See Table 3.5 for details.) 
 
Table 3.5 Agrochemical Applications in No. 8 Agro-Division  
Fertilizers Pesticides Agrofilm 
Year Area (‘000 ha) tonnes  kg/ha tonnes kg/ha tonnes kg/ha 
1990 152.4  74,701 490.2  643.0  4.2  2,173 14.3  
1991 156.9  78,157 498.1  954.0  6.1  3,036 19.3  
1992 149.5  87,996 588.6  845.0  5.7  3,110 20.8  




4.6  2,801 19.18 
19.2 
1994 145.0  80,346 554.3  832.4  5.7  4,091 28.2  
1995 146.7  87,051 593.4  907.7  6.2  4,356 29.7  
1996 149.0  106,008 711.5  914.8  6.1  4,594 30.8  
1997 149.8  116,597 778.5  1,145.4  7.6  5,379 35.9  
1998 154.9  125,350 809.4  1,098.1  7.1  7,211 46.6  
1999 154.55 
154.6 
117,773 762.0 937.9 6.1 7,741 50.1 
2000 156.5  124,413 795.0  1,035.9  6.6  8,673 55.4  
2001 160.5  116,814 728.0  1,125.9  7.0  8,074 50.3  
2002 162.2  116,064 715.7  872.9  5.4  8,750 54.0  
2003 153.3  124,951 814.9  1,261.2  8.2  9,200 60.0  
Source: XJPCC Statistical Yearbook (1991-2004) 
It is widely perceived that highly concentrated applications of chemical inputs will  not 
only contaminate the products of the field crops, and lead to yield reduction, but will also 
pose a serious danger to the ecosystem (for example, the surrounding soil and water 
quality) and human health (Rola and Pingali 1993). It will be useful to examine the 
potential impacts of the intensive application of these chemical inputs under current 
circumstances in Xinjiang. The following analysis will focus on the potential environmental 
effects of chemical fertilizers and agrofilm only, as residuals of pesticides, though 
damaging to human and animal health, may not have significant impact on the 
environment.  
One of the most serious problems with the excessive application of chemical fertilizers 
is the leaching of chemical contents into water bodies. The nutrients can accumulate in the 
water and contaminate the environment and surrounding eco-system. But there is no 
obvious evidence that fertilizers are damaging the environment in Xinjiang in this way as 
rainfall and irrigation water are so limited that no excessive nutrients leach to the 
surrounding environment under existing conditions. However, the potential negative 
impacts of intensive application of fertilizers on the physical and chemical characteristics of 






the eye, they can accumulate through time and will lead to a serious degradation of the soil 
and the environment in general. 
The super-thin agrofilm (0.5 mm thick) is easily broken into small pieces during the 
growing season. These small pieces of agrofilm are difficult to pick up and hence a large 
portion of them is left to accumulate in the soil. The small pieces of agrofilm remaining in 
the soil can prevent seedlings from sprouting, or the roots of seedlings from growing deep 
down into the soil. The current technique of cotton sowing by mechanically digging holes 
enables seedlings and roots to grow smoothly, so no reduction of yields have been reported 
in experiments designed to test the excessive use of agrofilm. However, other crops, 
especially small-seed crops, using different techniques may suffer from small pieces of 
agrofilm remaining in the soil. A survey has shown that the average quantity of agrofilm 
residues remaining in the soil in Xinjiang is 0.26 kg/ha after some 10 years of 
accumulation, and the yield losses range from 11-23% for maize, 9-16% for wheat, 5.5-9% 
for soybean, and 14.6-59.2% for vegetables when agrofilm residues reach 2.5 kg to 3 kg per 
mu (Agricultural Department of Xinjiang 2004).  
3.3   Natural Disasters and the Crop Insurance Program 
Its complicated topography, broad expanse, diverse natural environment, inclement 
weather and low rainfall makes the croplands in Xinjiang Autonomous Region the most 
threatened region in China. Some observed important indicators of land degradation in the 
region include loss of vegetation, loss of topsoil, severe droughts during the growing 
season, and reduction in biodiversity. As such, natural disasters occur frequently here with 
huge losses to agriculture. The major disasters are droughts, frost and freezing, wind and 
hail, floods, and snow disasters. (See Table 3.6 for details.) 
As shown in Table 3.6, the total areas affected by natural disasters range from 189.51 
to 366.12 thousand hectares during the 1990-2002 time period, with a peak level of 841.89 
thousand hectares in 1999. Droughts, frost, wind and hail, diseases and insect pests are the 
major types of natural disasters, with drought, wind and hail being the two most severe 
disasters. As the total areas affected by natural disasters account for about 10% of the total 
crop land in the whole region of Xinjiang on average, the losses to some individual 
producers are significant. Therefore, crop insurance is an appropriate measure for risk 
management. This is why it has been accepted by farmers, especially cotton producers, for 






Table 3.6  Areas Affected by Natural Disasters in Xinjiang Province 
Unit: ‘000 hectares 
Year Flood Drought 
Wind and 
Hail Frost Pests Others Total 
1990 9.95 61.36 68.28 2.98 39.35 7.52 189.44 
1991 16.93 184.46 82.60 15.60 28.46 11.13 339.18 
1992 23.40 44.66 146.86 63.46 37.86 27.06 343.30 
1993 32.87 34.03 91.46 27.52 30.24 3.83 219.95 
1994 32.76 101.31 115.95 31.78 48.50 52.83 383.13 
1995 32.47 150.70 145.70 25.29 87.95 6.51 448.62 
1996 80.12 58.27 109.64 40.59 41.62 40.15 370.39 
1997 18.90 113.80 86.80 4.70 23.60 1.10 248.90 
1998 54.88 13.08 235.45 16.47 45.75 7.72 373.35 
1999 104.33 33.14 178.04 115.00 352.31 59.04 841.86 
2000 32.14 311.95 108.55 4.97 195.89 55.60 709.10 
2001 68.79 105.95 248.04 73.13 45.21 10.28 551.40 
2002 142.45 13.61 137.76 3.85 5.77 13.09 316.53 
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Xinjiang (1991-2003)  
 
The China United Property Insurance Corporation (CUPIC) started its crop insurance 
program in 1986, first compulsorily inside the XJPCC. During the last two decades, crop 
insurance offered by the CUPIC has extended to non-CUPIC farmers in Xinjiang, and even 
to other provinces in recent years. The participation rate of crop insurance inside the 
XJPCC increased from 6.65 % in 1986 to 83.56% in 2003.11 At the same time, the annual 
crop insurance premium increased from RMB 2.07 million in 1986 to RMB 1620.83 
million in 2003 while annual indemnity payments increased from RMB 2.78 million to 







                                                 
11 The insurance coverage is relatively lower outside the XJPCC, resulting in a 45% coverage for cotton 






Table 3.7  Crop Insurance in XJPCC, 1986-2003 











1986 71.94 4.79 6.65 206.68 278.78 134.88 
1987 74.85 24.28 32.43 1067.03 975.59 91.43 
1988 74.86 35.34 47.20 2068.39 1569.61 75.89 
1989 75.84 40.88 53.90 2591.1 3037.7 117.24 
1990 78.08 41.67 53.36 3075 1869.08 60.78 
1991 80.78 50.31 62.28 4205.69 2293.53 54.53 
1992 81.02 54.56 67.34 4939.5 3474.2 70.34 
1993 78.7 50.6 64.30 5303.14 3793.47 71.53 
1994 78.74 54.78 69.57 6344.26 3599.59 56.74 
1995 81.3 59.4 73.06 8028.06 4549.76 56.67 
1996 83.11 59.64 71.75 10109.03 7831.83 77.47 
1997 86.42 60.65 70.17 11851.36 7869.64 66.40 
1998 89.21 62.8 70.40 13360.79 10356.82 77.52 
1999 91.48 66.39 72.57 15670.12 15994.82 102.07 
2000 90.98 64.23 70.59 15852.33 10833.81 68.34 
2001 91.63 66.89 73.00 17792.02 15343.16 86.24 
2002 92.49 67.47 72.95 19057.43 13113.33 68.81 
2003 91.2 76.2 83.56 20561.87 14562.07 70.82 
Sum 1492.58 940.81 63.03 162083.8 121346.79 74.87 
Source: China United Property Insurance Corporation (CUPIC) 2004 
The levels of both premium and indemnity in the crop insurance program currently 
available to Xinjiang cotton producers are quite low, reflecting the fact that low-income 
farmers can only afford to pay small premiums every year in order to receive minimum 
coverage. The current insurance scheme12 is designed to cover part of the material costs to 
restart production the following year, not to compensate yield losses. As such, this crop 
insurance is actually cost insurance, and farmers may receive insurance benefits up to 60% 
of the average material costs (fixed at RMB 250 in recent years) when the yield drops 
below 50% of the normal yield.  
Farmers who purchase their own insurance cannot select the coverage level or 
premium because the premium is fixed by the insurance company. The equation is as 
follows:  
)),(~),(~( ωδδ yEcE= = RMB 20 per mu                                  (3.1) 
Where, )(
~ cE , )(
~ yE  represent the proportional actual production history (APH) of 
costs and yields respectively, ω  denotes the damaging events that affect production, and 
                                                 






δ  is fixed and unchangeable at RMB 20 for the past two years and is the same in different 
areas. Farmers should sign the crop insurance contract before mid-May13 when cottonseeds 
have been germinated.  
A payable loss occurs only if the realized yield is less than the trigger yield, i.e., half 
of the normal yield in recent years. Payable losses on a crop for an insurance unit (which is 
one Tuanchang) are calculated as: 
Payable losses = trigger yield – realized yield 
If trigger yield < realized yield, payable losses = 0  
The above items indicate that the cotton insurance contracts are not sensitive to 
quantitative differences in risks and losses at the individual level. If a farmer’s realized 
yield, y, falls below the trigger yield, *y , he will receive a payment ( I ) equal to:  
*[ ,( )]  RMB 250  per muI I y yδ= − ≤                                                                           (3.2) 
I is a notion for the indemnity payment a farmer may receive, which is a function of 
the difference between the trigger yield and realized yield, with the maximum amount set at 
RMB 250. 
Whether farmers participate in the crop insurance program currently available to 
Xinjiang cotton producers (not subsidized by the government to date) depends on many 
factors including if they are able to make the decision themselves or not. Under the old 
planning system (before China’s reform which began in 1978) and within the XJPCC, the 
Tuanchang leaders used to make such a decision on behalf of the farmers in the regiment 
collectively. However, now the insurance company has extended its offer to non-XJPCC 
farmers who are free to purchase the insurance or not.  
Even inside the XJPCC, some immigrants have rented land from the XJPCC, farm on 
this rented land and participate in crop insurance programs on their own initiative. These 
immigrants are called “private farmers”, and the formal employees of the XJPCC are called 
“local farmers” as they work on land rented to their individual households by the XJPCC. 
These “local farmers” are officially affiliated with the XJPCC, entitled to pension, health 
care, and other social security benefits inside the XJPCC, and they are able to obtain low-
cost inputs from the XJPCC through large-volume purchases. As such, the XJPCC still has 
an important influence on decisions made by the “local farmers”, including that on crop 
insurance participation.  For the purpose of this study, “local farmers” are excluded from 
the empirical analysis.   
                                                 
13 The CUPIC contracts crop insurance with Tuanchangs, not individual farmers, but private farmers can 






4.0  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND MODEL 
 
4.1    Theoretical Framework 
The typical framework employed to evaluate the impact of crop insurance purchase 
decisions on cropping patterns and/or agrochemical usage is based on the standard 
assumption that farmers maximize expected utility of agricultural production profit by 
choosing production factors such as fertilizers and pesticides, and crop insurance, (crop 
insurance is treated as a factor in the utility function as it affects the expected returns from 
the production) subject to physical and technical constraints (Wu 1999; Wu and Adams 
2001; Babcock and Hennessy 1996; Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993; Quiggin 1992). As 
noted by Smith and Goodwin (1996)), if crop insurance is purchased, the farmer  may adopt 
different farming practices to increase the expected returns from his crop insurance 
coverage. It is also likely that the opportunity to adjust farming practices will affect the 
farmer’s decision to insure his crops or not (Smith and Goodwin 1996).  
There seems to be an agreement that (Smith and Goodwin 1996) crop insurance 
participation decisions influence input decisions and vice versa. Disagreements among 
researchers arise as to whether the influence is one way or two ways, i.e., the decisions are 
made recursively or simultaneously, and how, to what extent and under what conditions 
such influence takes effect. The argument of researchers such as Horowitz and Litchtenberg 
(1993), and Mishra, Nimon and El-Osta (2005) who support the recursive hypothesis lies in 
the timing, or the sequence in decision-making. They argue that farmers purchase crop 
insurance well before the application of most agrochemicals, so the decision to purchase 
crop insurance is not dependent on the decision on agrochemical use. However, when they 
apply agrochemicals, they will take the purchase of crop insurance into consideration. As 
such, the decisions are made recursively, i.e., one decision made earlier influences the other 
made later, but not vice versa. Other researchers such as Smith and Goodwin (1996) 
supporting the simultaneous hypothesis argue that the issue is the timing of decision-
making, not the timing of action-taking. When farmers make a decision on crop insurance 
purchase, no matter how much earlier before the growing season, they have already made 
decisions on agrochemical use. These decisions, or plans, on later actions must have been 
taken into consideration in deciding and implementing earlier action. As such decisions 
have been made year after year, farmers are fully aware of the consequences, and their 
decisions should be made interdependently, i.e., simultaneously.  
To clarify the issue, a simple model of crop insurance and input use is derived from a 
profit maximization function. Let the production technology be stated as: 
    ),( ωxfy =                                                                                           (4.1) 
where vector x  denotes  inputs, vector n ω denotes  random factors, and   








Intuitively, elements of ω , the source of production risk are beyond the control of 
the farmer (properties of land, weather, etc.,) as well as potentially damaging events (hail, 
floods, pests and diseases, etc.) that affect production can be associated with inputs.   
In general, we expect inputs to raise output at all times, under given conditions, 
assuming the farmer is a rational decision-maker  i.e., 0),( ≥= ωxfy .  
Let p be the random price per unit of output, while input prices denoted by the n -
dimensional vector w > 0 are presumed non-random. Let wxpy=1 −π  denote the state-
contingent farm profit in the absence of insurance. Suppose the farmer has an insured yield 
level, , and he can purchase this level of insurance at a fixed premium 
*y δ , where  and 
*y
δ  are assumed to be determined exogenously. If the actual yield, y , is less than y , an 
indemnity amounting to  will be paid. The net revenue under crop insurance 





wxyyIpy −−−+=π 2 ω , 
call it the trigger state denoted by , the insurer’s expected payout is determined by the 
farmer’s choice of 
*ω
x . If the insurer cannot perfectly observe ω  or write a contract 
contingent on x , there may be the possibility of moral hazard, and an adverse selection will 
occur if there exists a parameter of function )(= •fy which is known by the farmer but not 
the insurer prior to choosing x .  
If the farmer is risk averse, he will choose an x  which maximizes the expected utility 
of production profit. 







where  is the bounded support of , which is the cumulative 
distribution function of 
max
min[ ,y y ]
)(yG
y . miny and 
maxy denote the minimum and maximum yields 
respectively, π  is the production profit and is the expected utility. EU
Equation (4.2) highlights the connection between the farmer’s expected utility of 
profit and his input and crop insurance purchase decisions. 
From the analysis above, the relationship between a farmer’s use of x  and his 
insurance contract can be expressed by equation 4.3 below. 
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Equation (4.3) indicates that x  is influenced by the output price, p ; the factors 
affecting the output, ω , especially the trigger state under insurance ; the input price, w ; 
and the insurance premium, 
*ω
δ . 
                 ( , )y xω ω=                                                                                          (4.4) 
Whenever ω  falls below , the insurer will pay compensation to the farmer. So, the 
trigger state determines whether the farmer purchases the crop insurance. Effectively, 
the insurer is gambling with a farmer who knows the odds of the game that remain hidden 
from the insurer. Knowing this, the farmer has the incentive to take advantage of the 
insurer’s ignorance with altering or influencing 
*ω
*ω
ω  through the use of x . 
In conclusion, the farmer’s choice of x  and his insurance purchase interacts 
simultaneously. Inputs may have different impacts with regard to maximum utility of profit. 
Some inputs, such as fertilizers, are able to increase the expected yields. However, their 
application is likely to increase variations in the yield as well. The equilibrium level of 
application of such inputs is determined by the expected yield and variation, as well as by 
input and output prices. Other inputs, such as pesticides, are able to reduce yield losses in 
case of serious infection of pests and/or diseases. As such, they are likely to reduce 
downward variations, but not upward variations in expected yields. Crop insurance is likely 
to have the same effect with regard to profit maximization as it provides indemnity when 
the actual yield turns out to be below the pre-fixed trigger level. Whether material inputs 
and crop insurance interact simultaneously depends on many factors, but their functions in 
profit maximization are the key to understanding farmers’ behavior. 
High levels of fertilizer application make crops more exuberant and vulnerable to 
unfavorable unexpected natural conditions. Under unfavorable conditions, the losses will be 
greater for exuberant crops compared with less exuberant ones. Therefore, if the application 
of one input will increase the vulnerability of the crop’s exposure to natural disasters, a 
farmer who is going to increase that input is more likely to participate in crop insurance in 
order to get some compensation if and when an extreme outcome occurs. If increased 
application of one input can lead to a higher expected yield as well as a higher variation in 
yield, and the crop insurance program promises to provide indemnity to cover at least part 
of the losses due to increased variation in yield, farmers may take the opportunity to 
increase their application of the input (from the previous equilibrium level) and purchase 
crop insurance at the same time. However, if the trigger level is below the realized yield 
level, the yield variation increases, or the expected indemnity the farmer may receive is 
smaller than the total costs (actual costs plus increased risks), he may not have the incentive 
to increase his input. In this case, he may participate in crop insurance to guard against 
extreme disasters, but will not increase his inputs. 
There are considerable factors directly and indirectly influencing farmers’ insurance 
and input decisions. We can investigate such characteristics or variables by doing some 






















































































Figure 4.1 Interaction between Crop Insurance, Farmers’ Production Decisions and the 
Environment 








Figure 4.1 indicates the complicated interactions between risk, crop insurance, 
production decisions, and the environment. It shows how exogenous factors determined 
outside the agricultural production system, such as the weather, climate, population, and so 
on, feed into endogenous choices and factors, such as the economic environment, for 
example, perfect versus imperfect markets, market mechanisms, and production choices. 
The nature of production, in turn, determines environmental consequences. And the 
culmination of all these factors collectively determines the farmer’s final goal: 
maximization of production profit.  
For purposes of this study, a set of exogenous variables is selected along with those 
representing crop insurance participation and agrochemical uses. To test the relationship 
between crop insurance participation and agrochemical uses, the impact of the exogenous 
variables on crop insurance participation and agrochemical uses will be estimated at the 
same time. 
4.2     Econometric Model  
Procedures for estimating the relationship between insurance purchase and input use 
are developed from the profits maximization theoretical framework discussed in section 4.1. 
In the case of cotton production in the XJPCC, for example, the sign-up date by which crop 
insurance has to be purchased is in mid-May – cotton farmers may have already applied 
large amounts of fertilizers and agrofilm by the sign-up deadline. Additional applications 
also occur later in the growing season. Pesticides may also be applied prior to and after the 
crop insurance sign-up date. As explained earlier, farmers who apply chemical fertilizers 
and pesticides before taking on an insurance policy may have already taken this decision 
into consideration. Therefore, it is appropriate to hypothesize that crop insurance and input 
decisions may indeed be made simultaneously. Additionally, pesticides, agrofilm and 
fertilizers may have different risk properties (Pope and Krame 1979; Quiggin 1992) and 
disaggregating the three is warranted. 
Given cultivation practices and the institutional arrangement, the following 
simultaneous equation system, similar to Smith and Goodwin’s (1996) is employed in this 
research. 
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where i = 1, 2, 3; 
ty1  represents crop insurance purchase, modeled as a dichotomous choice taking the 
value 1 if the farmers are voluntarily insured, and 0 if the farmer does not 
purchase insurance; 
i
ty2  represents the ith chemical inputs use,  is fertilizer,  is pesticide and  is 












tX  is a vector of exogenous variables relevant to insurance purchases and 
agrochemical use;  
sitμ  are unobserved disturbances that are assumed to be normally distributed with 
constant variances; and  
2121 ,  , ββαα and  are parameter vectors to be estimated.  
The distribution of  is discrete such that ty1
1   if y1*>0 (farmer purchased crop insurance) 
y1t =                                                                                                  
0   otherwise (farmer did not purchase insurance) 
 
For identification purposes, it is assumed that exogenous variables included in 1tX  
and 2tX  are allocated to either 1tX  or 2tX  but not both. The simultaneous-equation system of 
crop insurance and fertilizer, pesticide and agrofilm use decisions are estimated in a two-
stage procedure (Maddala 1983).  
In the first stage, the reduced form equations for the insurance decision and fertilizer, 
pesticide and agrofilm use decisions can be written as: 
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where  is an appropriately defined vector.  tZ
Equation (4.7) will be estimated by the MLE Probit method, and equation (4.8) will 
be estimated by the ordinary least squares method (OLS). In the second stage, equation 
(4.5) will be estimated using the MLE Probit method after substituting for , and 





This two-stage procedure gives consistent estimates of model coefficients (Maddala 
1983). However, the estimates of the variance of the coefficients may be inconsistent 
because predicted values of endogenous variables are used in the second stage of 
estimation. Maddala (1983) points out that the appropriate covariance matrix for a 
structural model with more than two discrete or censored endogenous variables is difficult 
to derive. So, bootstrap methods (Efron 1979, 1987; Newey 1987) are used to derive 
consistent estimates of variances in this analysis. Under the bootstrapping approach, a large 
number of pseudo samples equal in size to the number of observations in the original data is 






that one observation is drawn several times. For each pseudo sample, Nelson and Olson’s 
two–step procedures (Nelson and Olson 1978) are applied to generate a distribution of the 
consistently estimated structural parameter. Variances of model parameters are then 
consistently estimated by using the distribution. 
      Once valid estimates of parameters of the structural model and their respective 
covariance matrices have been obtained, the Wu-Hausman (Hausman 1978; Wu 1973) 
specification test will be performed to test the null hypotheses that (a) crop insurance 
purchase decisions are exogenous in chemical input uses, and (b) chemical input uses are 
exogenous in crop insurance purchase decisions. These estimates can be compared to those 
obtained by standard OLS and Probit estimates that ignore simultaneity. Under the null 
hypothesis that standard OLS and MLE Probit estimates yield correct specifications, 
Hausman (1978) shows that equation (4.9) has a  distribution with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of coefficients being evaluated, where
2χ
0β  and 1β  are estimates of the 
standard OLS/Probit and instrumental variable parameters, and )( 0βV  and )( 1βV  are their  
respective covariance matrices. 




4.3     Data Used in the Research  
The primary data used in this study was collected through face-to-face interviews 
with farmer households in the Manasi Watershed. The questionnaires were designed to 
acquire information on crop insurance and cotton production practices. The focus of the 
survey was to link information on agricultural practices and the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the interviewed farmers to their crop insurance purchase and chemical 
input decisions. The questionnaire was divided into the following sections. 
1.   The first section attempted to identify the land allocated to cotton and other crops such 
as tomato, maize, and wheat; average cotton yield; and income from cotton, other 
crops, livestock and off-farm work. Questions on irrigation systems used were also 
included in this section.  
2.  The second section consisted of questions aimed at investigating production costs,  
especially agrochemicals such as fertilizers 14 , pesticides and agrofilm. We 
disaggregated fertilizers into nitrogenous fertilizers, phosphate fertilizers, potash 
fertilizers and compound fertilizers, and pesticides were divided into herbicides, 
insecticides and other pesticides. All these variables are converted into expenditures (in 
RMB per mu) on each kind of chemical input. 
3. The third section was devoted to the collection of socio-economic data. It was assumed 
that age, education, farming experience of the farmer, number of family members, and 
so on, were important determinants in farmers’ production behaviors and crop 
                                                 
14 Pig raising is the major livestock in conjunction with family crop production and a source of farm livelihood in China. 
It is also a major source of manure used in crop production. However, farmers in our sample and in northwest China in 
general, do not raise pigs due to religious reasons. As such, they seldom use pig manure in their crop production so 






insurance purchase decisions. 
Consequently, three criteria were set for the selection of the survey site: 1) high 
importance of cotton production in local agriculture; 2) crop insurance was an important 
element in farmers’ decisions; and 3) the vulnerability of the environment from increasing 
agrochemical use. Based on these criteria, the research team chose the Manasi Watershed as 
the area for their study, interviewing farmers in Manasi County and Shawan County, as 
well as both the “private” and “local  farmers” in the No. 8 and No. 6 Agro-Divisions of the 
XJPCC. 
Prior to the implementation of the full-scale survey, a pilot study was conducted in 
January and February 2004 in the same study site, with the results presented at the EEPSEA 
Biannual Workshop in May 2004. The full-scale household survey was conducted in July 
2004 and preliminary results were presented at the EEPSEA Biannual Workshop in 2005. 
Based on suggestions received at the workshop, those “local farmers” whose participation 
in crop insurance was made compulsory by the Tuanchangs were omitted in the final 
analysis. This is because the Tuanchangs still have a strong influence on decisions made by 
“local farmers”, including that on crop insurance participation. Thus the farmers do not 
really have full freedom of choice in crop insurance and chemical input decisions. As the 
farmers’ free choice in decision-making is the basis of the issue under investigation, “local 
farmers” are excluded from the research. Only the information collected from the “private 
farmers” in the Tuanchangs and “ordinary farmers” (non-XJPCC farmers in Manasi County 
and Shawan County who make production decisions themselves) were used to derive 
conclusions.  
The sample sites were selected in three steps: 
1. Three Tuanchangs (the Shihezi Zongchang, the No. 141 Tuanchang of the No. 8 Agro-
Division, and the Xinhu Tuanchang of the No. 6 Agro-Division), the Manasi County 
and Shihezi Town were selected according to the Shihezi Social Almanac with the 
assistance of Shihezi University and CUPIC, taking cotton sown acreage as the 
representative indicator of cotton production. 
2. Four towns (Liuhudi, Baojiadian, Beiwucha, and Letuyi) in Manasi County were 
selected on the equal-interval principle15 according to cotton yield per unit of sown 
area. Two Lianduis (sub-unit of a Tuanchang) from Shihezi Zongchang, three Lianduis 
from No.141 Tuangchang, six Lianduis from Xinhu Tuanchang, four villages from 
Shihezi Town and seven villages from Manasi County were further selected on the 
same principle, based on production information provided by the local administration. 
3. Farmers, totaling 450, were randomly selected within the chosen sample of Lianduis 
and villages. 
The distribution of the sample is shown in Table 4.1. 
                                                 
15 The equal-interval principle is widely used in statistical sampling. All observations in the population are 
ranked according to the value of a selected character, and a sample is chosen by taking a certain number of 







Table 4.1 Distribution of the Sample 
Sample sites Number of households 
Shihezi Township 80 
Shihezi Zongchang 50 
No. 141 Tuanchang 60 
Xinhu Tuanchang 120 
Manasi County 140 
Total 450 
Source: Field survey (July 2004) 
 
Three hundred and forty respondents provided sufficiently complete information for 
the analysis. Among the 340 farmers, 113 of them (33.23%) voluntarily purchased crop 
insurance while the remaining 227 (66.77%) did not purchase crop insurance in 2003. All 
of them used fertilizers, pesticides and agrofilm in cotton production.  
The specific equations used in our analysis and the variable definitions are presented 







Table 4.2  Model Specifications and Variable Definitions  
Model Specifications   
Crop Insurance purchase = f (FERTILIZERS, PESTICIDES, AGROFILM, CV, FTF, DISR, CA, EDU, 
FEXPER，RISKATT)  
Fertilizer usage = f (COTTINS, EDU, FEXPER, DENSITY, DISEASE, SHRLIVE, LC, AVGCY, 
RISKATT) 
Pesticides usage = f (COTTINS, EDU, FEXPER, DENSITY, DISEASE, SHRLIVE, LC, AVGCY, 
RISKATT) 




COTTINS A zero-one discrete variable indicating whether farmers purchased crop insurance in 
2003 (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
FERTILIZERS Expenditure on aggregate fertilizers per mu including base fertilizers and late 
fertilizers in cotton production in 2003 (RMB per mu)  
PESTICIDES Expenditure on pesticides per mu of cotton production in 2003 (RMB per mu)  
AGROFILM Expenditure on agrofilm per mu of cotton production in 2003 (RMB per mu) 
DENSITY Cotton planting density per mu in 2003 (‘000s of individual plants per mu) 
DISEASE 
The degree of losses caused by pests and diseases from 1999 to 2002  
(1= average loss above 80 percent of normal yield, 5= average loss below 20 percent 
of normal yield) 
CV Coefficient of standard deviation of Tuanchang or county level average cotton yield 
from 1980-2002 (%) 
AVGCY Average cotton yields (from 2001 to 2002) (kg per mu) 
CA Cotton sown area by one farm household (mu) 
LC Land capability (1 =  very good, 3 = poor)  
SHRLIVE Share of off-farm income and livestock sales in total net income (%) 
DISR Whether farmer received government disaster relief in the previous four years from 
1999 to 2002 (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
RISKATT The farmer’s risk attitude (1= lowest risk aversion, 5= highest risk aversion) 
FEXPER Number of years that farmer has occupied an agricultural farm in a Tuanchang or 
village (no. of years) 
FTF Whether farmer is in full-time farming (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
EDU Number of years farmer has received school education (no. of years)   







In addition to crop insurance participation and agrochemical application data, a set of 
farm household survey data was collected with regard to cropping patterns: acreages 
planted with major crops including cotton, wheat, maize, potato, and oil-bearing crops. The 
data was used to construct variables similar to those used in previous studies (Smith and 
Baquet 1996; Smith and Goodwin 1996) such as total acreages and percentage of total 
cropland planted with cotton and other crops. The average area planted with other crops for 
insured and uninsured farmers was 1.28 mu and 9.95 mu per farm, respectively. It is 
evident that those who purchased insurance allocated almost all their croplands to cotton 
production.  
To obtain consistent estimators, all estimation methods must impose restrictions or 
identification conditions on the exogenous variables in the simultaneous models. Therefore, 
it is of interest to impose as many a priori restrictions as are theoretically reasonable and 
determine the validity of these restrictions. In other words, we must find some variables 
with their impacts restricted to only crop insurance purchase, and others with their impacts 
restricted to only agrochemical uses in order to validate the model. If all variables impact 
both decisions, then the model cannot provide consistent estimates. On theoretical grounds, 
those variables influencing cotton yield variability (or expectation of variability) inter-
temporally (i.e., from year to year) and in a large surrounding area will affect farmers’ crop 
insurance demands as they indicate the potential fluctuation any farmer may face in the 
region. But they will not influence farmers’ chemical and other input decisions as these 
decisions are more relevant to conditions on individual farms. In contrast, variables 
influencing yield level (not yield variability) on farmers’ individual farms will have an 
impact on farmers’ chemical input decisions, but not on crop insurance.  
The cotton acreage (CA) variable was employed to reflect any scale effect. A positive 
correlation between cotton acreage and participation in crop insurance is possible because 
losses in cotton production due to extreme weather are greater in larger cotton farms 
(Goodwin 1993; Goodwin, Smith and Hammond 2000; Goodwin, Vandeveer and Deal 
2001). This variable is not used in chemical input equations because chemical inputs are 
measured by the average amount per unit of sown area rather than total application. 
The variable used in this study to measure the yield fluctuation is not the individual 
farmer’s yield variation, but the coefficient of standard deviation (CV) of cotton yields at 
the Tuanchang and/or county levels for the 1980 to 2002 period.16 A similar specification 
was considered in Goodwin (1993), Smith and Goodwin (1996), and Goodwin,  Vandeveer 
and Deal (2001). It is believed that farmers tend to look at the average variation in yield in 
surrounding farms instead of just in their own farms when making risk management 
decisions.  This variable would therefore reflect the general trend over a large area and may 
not have a strong impact on a farmer’s chemical input decisions on his own land.   
As indicated by Smith and Goodwin (1996), the government’s disaster relief program 
may have a negative effect on crop insurance purchase decisions. But it is probable that 
farmers who received government disaster relief in the previous four years would be more 
                                                 
16 Under the APH (Actual Production History) insurance program, coverage levels and premium rates are computed 
based on the insured’s expected yield. The expected yield is usually calculated as the average yield at the county level 






likely to participate in crop insurance. This is because the government disaster relief 
program aims only to provide for the subsistence needs of victims in a natural calamity, not 
to give full compensation for loss. Thus, crop insurance might be viewed by recipients as a 
risk management measure complementary to disaster relief provided by the government.    
Other factors expected to affect insurance purchase decisions include whether or not 
the farmer farms full time. Full-time farmers (FTF) may be more willing to purchase crop 
insurance because they do not have alternative revenue sources. However, as pointed out by 
Goodwin (1993), a negative effect may be possible because full-time farmers may have a 
higher degree of specialized expertise in production practices than part-time farmers and 
thus, may have a lower demand for crop insurance. 
Information on different sources of net income including off–farm income and sales 
derived from livestock was used to calculate the share of off-farm income and net income 
from livestock (SHRLIVE). Net incomes from the two sources were combined because 
they played the same role in risk aversion, and most farmers could receive income from 
either off-farm jobs or livestock production but not both. This variable was used to reflect 
farmers’ budget constraints on chemical inputs. This variable also reflects farm 
diversification and thus may affect the demand for crop insurance. However, it was more 
reasonable to use the farmer’s employment characteristics (FTF) rather than SHRLIVE to 
reflect the effect of farm diversification on the demand for crop insurance in order to satisfy 
the condition of identificability17 of simultaneous equations.  
Farmers’ preference for risk-seeking (a term used to describe the attitude of a person 
who is willing to take higher risks if the expected or average returns are also higher) or 
aversion, RISKATT, measured by their willingness to purchase health insurance, was used 
to test if the farmers’ stated risk attitude with regard to health care was consistent with their 
crop insurance purchase. It is expected that if the stated preference is consistent with the 
revealed or “true” preference across different areas, a negative coefficient may result 
because the value of this variable measures the farmer’s preference for risk aversion, as 
opposed to risk-seeking.  
Farmers’ planting practices such as cotton plant density may influence agrochemical 
application (DENSITY). It is expected that farms with a higher cotton density would apply 
more pesticides and agrofilm, but less fertilizer, because such higher density would lead to 
higher insect populations and thus, potential losses from insect infection are likely to be 
higher.  
The losses in cotton production caused by insects and disease (DISEASE) in the four 
years from 1999-2002, the average cotton yield (AVGCY) in the two years from 2001 to 
2002, and the land capability (LC) were other direct factors selected in this study as 
influencing farmers’ chemical input decisions. The losses in cotton production caused by 
insects and disease, from 1999 to 2002, reflect a farmer’s individual yield losses under local 
environmental conditions in a specific region. As this has no obvious relationship with the 
yield variation in a large surrounding area, the variable DISEASE may only influence a 
farmer’s chemical input decisions. 
                                                 






Land capability may have a stable impact on farmers’ cotton yields in the long term, 
and is not obviously correlated with yield fluctuation. For the same reason, the average 
cotton yield of the past two years is the outcome of chemical inputs in the past, and reflects 
the production relationship between output and chemical inputs. This lagged yield may 
affect existing chemical input decisions but not necessarily the crop insurance decision. The 
variations in AVGCY may reflect differences in actual cotton yields across regions, while 
the values of LC are subjective numbers assigned by individual farmers that reflect the 
relative fertility of land within villages. Nevertheless, a simple correlation test was 
conducted and the resulting correlation coefficient of 0.10 suggests no multicollinearity 
between the two variables.  
Similarly, the socio-economic characteristics of the farmer including his farming 
experience (FEXPER) and education level (EDU), which may affect production technology 
and the demand for insurance, were included in the simultaneous model. All these variables 
may have a positive or negative effect on crop insurance purchase and agrochemical use. 
The average farming experience and average education levels were eighteen years and 
seven years respectively. 
The reliability of our estimation results hinges on the validity of our instruments (i.e., 
our exclusion restrictions). We conducted an over-identification restriction test to make sure 
that our instruments were valid.18 To statistically examine the validity of our two sets of 
instrumental variables (one for the crop insurance purchase structural equation and the other 
for the chemical inputs structural equation, we conducted a likelihood ratio test (LR) 
(Bollen, Guilkey and Mroz 1995; Wooldridge 2002) for equation (4.5)19 and a Hausman 
over-identification restriction test (Wooldridge 2002) for equation (4.6)20 respectively.  
                                                 
18 When we have more instrumental variables (IVs) than we need to identify an equation, we can test whether the 
additional IVs are valid in the sense that they are uncorrelated with  or . This test is an exclusion restriction test 
(i.e., over-identification restriction test). The number of over-identifying restrictions is equal to the excluded exogenous 
variables minus the endogenous explanatory variables.  The usefulness of the over-identifying restrictions test is that, if we 
reject the null hypothesis, then the instrumental variables are invalid, leading to biased parametric estimates, and our logic 
for choosing the instrumental variables must be re-examined. If we fail to reject the null hypothesis, then we can have 
some confidence in the overall set of instruments used.  See footnotes 19 and 20 for details.  
1tu 2tu
19 The LR test involves a comparison of the value of the log-likelihood function ( ( )urL β ) from an unrestricted estimation 
of the reduced form of Eq. (4.5) with the value of the log-likelihood function ( ( )rL β ) from the estimation of the 
structural form of Eq. (4.5) when we use the predicted amounts of chemical inputs in place of the actual amounts. Under 
the null hypothesis that exclusion restrictions are valid, the test statistic for no significant difference between ( )urL β  and 
( )rL β  that involves –2 times the difference of the two log-likelihoods (i.e. ( 2) [ ( ) ( )]r uL L rβ β− × −  ) is 
asymptotically chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying restrictions (the number of 
excluded exogenous variables minus 3). A statistically insignificant test statistic indicates that the instruments can be 
safely excluded from the crop insurance demand equation. In this study, the instrumental variables were found to be valid. 
20 The Hausman test is a Lagrange multiplier test (Hausman 1983). The chi-square distributed test statistic with k−1 
degrees of freedom, where k is the number of Ivs (instrumental variables), is N× , where N is the number of 
observations, and  is the measure of the goodness of fit of the regression of the residuals from the second stage 
equations on the variables which are exogenous to the system. Under the null hypothesis that exclusion restrictions are 
valid, a statistically insignificant test statistic indicates that the instruments can be safely excluded from the chemical input 









The mean and standard deviation of each variable are presented in Table 4.3. As 
shown in table 4.3, one-third of the surveyed farmers participated in a crop insurance 
program), and the average expenditures of all farmers on chemical fertilizers, pesticides and 
agrofilm were RMB 94.09, 26.25 and 31.51 per mu, respectively.  
 
Table 4.3  Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
COTTINS 0.3324 0.4718 
FERTILIZER 94.0903 37.1337 
PESTICIDES 26.2502 18.8074 
AGROFILM 31.5155 8.1560 
EDU 7.7412 2.6189 
FEXPER 18.6206 11.3228 
FTF 0.6265 0.4845 
DISR 0.5382 0.4993 
CV 16.5813 7.2850 
CA 68.6176 75.9404 
RISKATT 3.3559 1.3236 
DENSITY 15.7342 6.4713 
DISEASE 2.5147 1.6428 
LC 2.0353 0.7634 
AVGCY 206.4651 53.2625 
SHRLIVE 8.4543 17.1037 
Source: Field survey (July 2004) 
 
The basic statistics are calculated from the survey data. A total number of 450 farm 
households were interviewed – 30 households participated in crop insurance programs 
because of the compulsory decision made by the XJPCC, 42 households indicated negative 
net incomes, and 38 households provided incomplete information. Therefore, information 




































Figure 4.2 Difference in Agrochemical Inputs between Insured and Uninsured Farmers 
Source: Calculated by authors 
 
Figure 4.2 pictures the differences in usage of fertilizers, agrofilm and pesticides 
between farmers with and without crop insurance. The insured farmers were inclined to 
apply more fertilizer and agrofilm while there was nearly no difference in pesticide 
application between insured and uninsured farmers. However, the actual relationship 
between crop insurance and chemical usage is still a research question waiting for empirical 
evidence.  
 
5.0  EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
5.1   Endogeneity of Input Decisions 
The test of over-identifying restrictions produces a likelihood ratio statistic of 4.11 for 
the crop insurance structural equation and Lagrange multiplier statistic of 5.54, 5.88 and 
2.58 for agrofilm, fertilizer and pesticide inputs structural equations respectively; these do 
not exceed the chi-square distributed critical value of 4.61 with two degrees of freedom for 
the crop insurance equation and 6.25 with three degrees of freedom for chemical input 
equations at 10% level of significance. So we do not reject the null hypothesis that the 






statistics indicate that the two sets of instruments can be safely excluded from the crop 
insurance and chemical inputs equations respectively.  
As stated in the theoretical framework, participation in crop insurance is treated as a 
special kind of input in cotton production in this study. Whether the decision on 
participation in crop insurance is exogenously or endogenously related to other inputs 
requires empirical tests. A Wu-Hausman specification test was performed to test the null 
hypotheses that (a) crop insurance purchase decisions are exogenous in chemical input uses 
and (b) chemical input uses are exogenous in crop insurance purchase decisions before 
further application of econometric models. The estimated Wu-Hausman  statistics are 
reported in Table 5.1. 
2χ
The first  statistic has three degree of freedom while the following three  statistics 
have one degree of freedom each. The P-values of the estimated  statistics indicate that 
the exogeneity hypothesis is rejected for FERTILIZERS, AGROFILM and PESTICIDES in 
the crop insurance purchase model at a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, 
and for the three as a whole at 1% significance level. The exogeneity hypothesis is also 
rejected for the variable COTTINS in the pesticide inputs equation at 10% level of 








2χ Test Statistics 
P-Value for the 
Statistics 
  Exogeneity of chemical inputs 






Exogeneity of fertilizer  
input in crop insurance  
discrete choice model 
32.48 0.0000*** 
Exogeneity of agrofilm  
input in crop insurance  
discrete choice model 
4.09 0.043** 
Exogeneity of pesticide  
input in crop insurance  
discrete choice model 
2.97 0.085* 
Exogeneity of crop insurance 






Exogeneity of crop insurance 






Exogeneity of crop insurance 







Source: Estimated by authors 








The results of the Wu-Hausman specification test suggest that farmers’ decisions on 
crop insurance participation are endogenously made with those on agrochemical inputs; 
however, their decisions on agrochemical inputs, except pesticides, may not be 
endogenously made with that on crop insurance participation. 
However, we think it is appropriate to further test the hypothesis with a simultaneous 
equation system in this analysis. Because the provision of crop insurance under the same 
terms has been in effect for more than a decade, farmers who have already made up their 
minds to purchase crop insurance will apply more fertilizers and agrofilm, and less 
pesticides accordingly in subsequent months. In such cases, the decisions on agrochemical 
use and crop insurance purchase are likely to have been made jointly long before being 
implemented. In other words, they are simultaneous decisions but implemented at different 
times. 
 
5.2    Impact of Chemical Inputs on Crop Insurance 
The bootstrapped parameter estimates and implied marginal probability effects for the 
Probit model of the discrete cotton insurance purchase decision (see  Eq. 4.5 and Eq. 4.6) 
are presented in Table 5.2. The standard errors of the coefficients are estimated using the 
bootstrap method with 1,000 replications. The last column of Table 5.2 shows the changes 
in the probability to purchase the crop insurance given one unit of change in the 
explanatory variables and are computed using the mean value of all explanatory variables.  
The whole model highly fits the observations, as the model shows a high predictive power 
of close to 99%. 
The coefficients on variables FEXPER and EDU are negative and statistically 
significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively. This suggests that farmers who have more 
farming experience and higher levels of education tend to purchase crop insurance less 
frequently. One explanation for this is that these farmers have or believe they have better 
risk management skills, so they need less protection from crop insurance programs. The 
coefficients on cotton acreage (CA) and whether the farmer is working full-time in 
agriculture (FTF), as expected, are positive and statistically significant at 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. This indicates that the farmers working full-time in agriculture are more likely 
to participate in crop insurance because they do not have alternative sources of income to 
disperse risks. At the same time, farmers with larger cotton fields are more inclined to 
purchase cotton insurance as their losses are likely to be more severe than those who have 







Table 5.2   Estimates of the Probit Model of Cotton Insurance Decisions (bootstrap method 
with 1000 replications) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficienta Standard Error 
Marginal 
Probabilityb     
(dy/dx) 
CONSTANT -119.3245** 33.7683 n.a. 
AGROFILM 1.2775** 0.3741 0.2637 
PESTICIDES -0.4682** 0.1609 -0.0966 
FERTILIZERS 0.2165** 0.0797 0.0581 
FEXPER -0.1486** 0.0525 -0.0307 
RISKATT -0.1004 0.2321 -0.0207 
DISR 0.6319 0.9272 0.1346 
FTF 3.1369* 1.3954 0.7829 
EDU -0.6652* 0.2886 -0.1373 
CV 4.1384** 1.2736 0.8543 
CA 0.0488** 0.0163 0.0100 
 
LR (9)= 401.78               Number of observations = 340 2χ
Prob >  = 0.0000               Pseudo R2χ 2 =0.9293           
Percent correctly predicted = 98.82 
Source: Estimated by this study 
Notes: 
(1) a * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
(2) b dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
 
As expected, the coefficient of the standard deviation of the average yield at 
Tuanchang or county level (CV) is positive and highly significant, suggesting that farmers 
in the Tuanchangs or counties with higher yield variations are more likely to purchase crop 
insurance than those facing lower yield variations. The positive and significant coefficients 
on cotton acreage and full-time farming confirm that farmers working on larger cotton 
fields tend to insure the crop, and that full-time farmers are more risk averse.  
However, the coefficient on RISKATT, a five-scale dummy variable using farmers’ 
willingness to participate in health insurance as a proxy for risk attitude in cotton 
production, has the correct sign though insignificant, which might be explained by the 
inaccuracy of the proxy used in estimation. At the same time, DISR, a discrete zero-one 
variable set equal to one if the farmer received government disaster relief in the past four 






relief fund is a clear signal that natural disasters can cause serious reduction in cotton 
production and farmers’ incomes, so some farmers may seek additional protection by 
participating in crop insurance programs.  
The most interesting result concerns the effects of agrochemical inputs on crop 
insurance purchase decisions. As shown in Table 5.2, both AGROFILM and 
FERTILIZERS have positive coefficients significant at 1% level, while that of 
PESTICIDES is negative and significant at 1% level. This suggests that the more fertilizer 
and agrofilm a farmer applies, the more likely he is to purchase crop insurance. On the 
contrary, the more pesticides he applies, the less likely he is to participate in crop insurance. 
One plausible explanation is that the increasing application of chemical fertilizers and 
agrofilm leads to stronger growth of cotton plants, resulting in higher yields and higher 
variation in yields. Inevitably, the probability of lower (below expected average) yields will 
increase. Therefore, farmers tend to purchase crop insurance against increased risks 
associated with more intensive application of chemical fertilizers and agrofilms. It is widely 
accepted that pesticides do not increase yield potential, they only affect yield when 
damaging agents such as pests and disease are present (Lichtenberg and Zilberman 1986). 
The result of this study confirms that the more pesticides a farmer applies, the less likely he 
is to purchase crop insurance, as the probability of lower yields is likely to be reduced by 
the increasing application of pesticides.  
The results of this research are consistent with conventional knowledge that fertilizer 
is a risk-increasing input while pesticides is a risk-reducing input. It is also demonstrated 
that agrofilm may have the same effect as fertilizers in this regard. The empirical estimates 
show that, ceteris paribus, each additional RMB spent on fertilizers and agrofilm increases 
the probability of insurance purchase by 36.11% and 7.46% respectively; however, each 
additional RMB spent on pesticides lowers the probability of insurance purchase by 
12.82%.  
5.3   Impact of Crop Insurance on Agrochemical Inputs 
Parameter estimates of the structural equations for agrochemical inputs are presented 
in Table 5.3. Standard errors of these parameters are estimated using the bootstrap method 






Table 5.3  OLS and Bootstrap Estimates of Agrochemical Inputs 
Explained Variables 
Pesticides Fertilizers Agrofilm 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficienta Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
CONSTANT 18.3145*** 7.8097 61.1593*** 14.0200 24.2183***  2.5357 
COTTINS -5.0825** 2.6764 2.6714    6.3768 5.8695***  1.0898 
EDU  -0.0803 0.3321 2.5650***  0.7777 -0.0157 0.1746 
LC 2.1939* 1.4367 4.2422*  2.7169 0.3700  0.5144 
SHRLIVE 0.0278 0.0523 0.0343 0.1308 0.0462  2.2116 
DENSITY 0.2978** 0.1728 -0.1634 0.2527 0.0097 0.0600 
DISEASE  -1.7042*** 0.5351 1.9309*  1.2648 0.3794* 0.2609 
FEXPER -0.1767** 0.0968 0.2069      0.1948 0.0027    0.0437 
AVGCY 0.0469** 0.0211 -0.0026  0.0486 0.0177**  0.0083 
RISKATT -0.5926 0.8495 -0.6676 1.6139 -0.0269 0.2857 
Adj. R2 0.0325 0.0188 0.1704 
Source: Estimated by authors 
Notes: 
(1) a *, ** and *** indicate statistical significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
(2) Sample size = 340 
 
The coefficients on individual cotton plants per mu (DENSITY) are, as expected,  
positive in the PESTICIDES and AGROFILM application equations, and negative in the 
FERTILIZERS application equation, but only statistically significant in the PESTICIDES 
equation. This result suggests that the higher the cotton density a farmer has, the more 
pesticides he will apply as the possibility of insect and disease occurrence increases with 
plant density. On the other hand, in order to ensure the healthy growth of individual cotton 
plants on densely planted fields, the application of fertilizers must be controlled in order to 
prevent over-growth of the plants. Due to insufficient rainfall, most farmers along the 
Manasi Watershed adopt water-saving technologies, for example, dripping irrigation. As 
agrofilm can prevent the evaporation of moisture from the soil, a higher application rate is 
required with higher density planting. 
The parameter estimate for DISEASE is negative and significant at 1% level in the 
PESTICIDES equation, and positive and significant at 10% level in both the 
FERTILIZERS and AGROFILM equations. These indicate that the less the losses caused 
by insects and disease in the past four years; the less pesticides and the more fertilizer and 
agrofilm a farmer will apply. These results are consistent with the belief that intensive 
applications of fertilizers and agrofilm have a positive impact on the infestation of pests 
(especially aphids) and disease when rainfall is low. Therefore, the occurrence of pests and 






The performance of soil characteristics (LC) has the expected positive sign  in all the 
three chemical input equations and is significant at 10% level in both PESTICIDES and 
FERTILIZERS equations. Farmers with lower land productivity tend to apply more 
pesticides and fertilizers. For the same reason, the average cotton yields in the previous two 
years (AVGCY) have a positive effect on the application of fertilizers, pesticides and 
agrofilm, and are significant at 5% level in the PESTICIDES and AGROFILM equations, 
though not significant in the FERTILIZERS equation. The coefficient for the share of off-
farm income and net income derived from livestock (SHRLIVE) is positive, as expected, 
but not significant for all the three input equations.  
The coefficients for education and farming experience indicate that more experienced 
farmers tend to apply less pesticides, suggesting that pesticides may be over-used due to 
inadequate information by less-educated and inexperienced farmers. Farmers with higher 
education tend to apply more fertilizers. This suggests that farmers with more education 
spend more on fertilizers and this is consistent with the expectation that better educated 
farmers are more adept at acquiring and processing information that is available from 
various sources, and then adopting and implementing recommendations and solutions that 
are relevant to their specific problem (Mishra, Nimon and El-Osta 2005). 
Again, the most interesting result of the chemical inputs equations is the coefficient 
for COTTINS. As shown in table 5.3, the coefficient on COTTINS is negative and 
significant at 5% level for the PESTICIDES equation, and positive for both FERTILIZERS 
and AGROFILM equations, but only significant at 1% level for AGROFILM and not 
significant for FERTILIZERS. The results show that the greater the probability that a 
farmer purchases crop insurance, the less he will spend on pesticides, but the more he will 
spend on both agrofilm and fertilizers. This confirms the Horowitz and Lichtenberg’s 
(1993) presumption that fertilizers and agrofilm are risk-increasing inputs while pesticides 
are risk-reducing inputs.  
In reality, rainfall is severely inadequate, land fertility is fairly low, and the 
occurrence of aphid pests is comparatively frequent in Xinjiang. In particular, the increased 
application of fertilizers and agrofilm will lead to large amounts of insect populations and 
thus, large potential losses. There have been reports that pests are becoming an increasingly 
serious problem in Xinjiang in recent years as opposed to its reputation of low infection of 
pests in the past. Under such conditions, the increased application of chemical fertilizers 
and agrofilm inputs raises expected yields as well as the variance of yields. However, the 
losses due to the increased variance can be large enough to offset the increase in yields. 
Additional chemical fertilizers and agrofilm inputs may actually raise the probability of low 
yields, while increased pesticides should result in a decreased probability of low yields, 
which suggests that a farmer who insures against low yields will increase fertilizers and 
agrofilm, and decrease pesticide use.  
The findings indicate that, on average, farmers with insurance apply RMB 5.87 more 
agrofilm and RMB 2.67 more fertilizers per mu, about 20.2% and 2.9% higher than the 
quantities applied by farmers who do not have crop insurance, respectively. At the same 
time, the farmers with insurance tend to apply RMB 5.08 less of pesticides per mu, or 






6.0  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1    Conclusions 
The methodology adopted in this study is similar to that of Smith and Goodwin 
(1996), but the empirical results are different. The results of this study strongly indicate that 
crop insurance purchase decisions depend on farmers’ production behavior: those who 
apply more chemical fertilizers and agrofilm are more likely to participate in crop insurance 
programs while those who apply more pesticides will do the opposite. The results also 
indicate that farmers’ agricultural chemical input decisions are influenced differently by the 
decision to purchase crop insurance: pesticides are likely to be applied less if cotton 
production is insured, while agrofilm and chemical fertilizers are likely to be applied more, 
though the latter case is not statistically significant. In contrast, Smith and Goodwin found 
that farmers with crop insurance will use less intensive chemical fertilizers and they claim 
that this must be because the expected returns from crop insurance declines with input use. 
The difference between our results and those found by Smith and Goodwin might be 
explained by several factors. Firstly, our estimation is disaggregated for each of the 
agrochemical inputs and this may have resulted in different findings compared with the 
results of Smith and Goodwin which were derived from aggregated data. Since the output 
and environmental impacts of pesticides, agrofilm and fertilizers are not identical, 
disaggregating the three is warranted. As such, pesticides, agrofilm and fertilizers may have 
different risk properties and indeed the regression results suggest that the effect of crop 
insurance on each is not identical. 
Secondly, the existing crop insurance program practiced in Xinjiang is designed to 
compensate for only a portion of the material costs incurred in the event of severe yield 
losses. The indemnity farmers can receive is much lower than the typical crop insurance 
program adopted in the US which provides compensation for a relatively larger portion of 
yield loss. Therefore, moral hazard is not likely to be a big issue in China today under the 
current crop insurance policy – farmers insure their crop basically against natural disasters, 
but not the additional yield variation resulting from increased agrochemical applications. 
This research has confirmed that fertilizers and agrofilm are risk-increasing inputs 
while pesticides is a risk-reducing input, so they influence farmers’ decisions to purchase 
crop insurance in different ways. This research has also found, under the current terms of 
low premium and low indemnity, that crop insurance may not cause serious impacts on the 
environment except for the accumulation of small pieces of broken agrofilm. The increase 
in fertilizer application is not statistically significant, but the reduction of pesticide 
application is significant.  
6.2    Implications and Recommendations 
The participation rate of cotton insurance in 2003 was 44.84% without premium 
subsidy. If China were to give 10% premium subsidy to encourage farmers to participate in 






application is likely to be reduced by about 2.21% while the total application of agrofilm is 
likely to increase by 9.15%. At the same time, if the insignificance is ignored, the total 
application of fertilizers is likely to be increased by 2.54% in Xinjiang without any change 
in total cotton sown acreage. (Note: here we assume that the total cotton sown areas remain 
the same for Xinjiang but that the subsidy will encourage more cotton producers to 
participate in crop (cotton) insurance. If we assume that crop (cotton) insurance changes 
farmers’ cropping patterns, such as shifting from maize, soybean and other crops to cotton, 
the calculation will be different as different crops require different amounts of inputs.) 
Under the existing insurance program, farmers cannot have a policy which provides a 
higher indemnity at a higher premium. There is only one policy with a fixed premium and 
indemnity per unit of cotton sown area. This is why we estimated farmers’ potential 
reactions separately: premium being reduced for the same indemnity, or indemnity being 
increased for the same premium payment from their own pockets. Our estimates indicate 
that, an increase in indemnity of up to 80% of the material costs from the 60% in 2003 may 
induce farmers to apply RMB 1.17 more of agrofilm per mu, RMB 0.53 more of fertilizers 
per mu, and RMB 1.02 less on pesticides per mu. This implies a total increase of agrofilm 
application by 3.7% and a total increase of fertilizer application by less than 0.56%, as well 
as a total decrease of pesticides by 3.89% in Xinjiang as a whole. 
It should be noted that farmers in Xinjiang grow one crop in a year while their 
counterparts in most other regions grow two or more. As agrochemical application rates are 
calculated for each crop, the chemical residuals in the soil are likely to be much lower in 
Xinjiang despite higher application rates of some agrochemical inputs in cotton production 
there compared with other regions.  
It also should be noted that the high application rate of agrofilm in Xinjiang is 
associated with the extreme climate there. As it is used to protect soil moisture from 
evaporation and to raise soil temperature in the early growing season, its importance and 
application rates are lower in other regions with better climates, especially in central and 
south China.  
Restricted by water availability in Xinjiang and by the availability of arable land in 
general in China, as well as the low-incentive (due to the low indemnity) to increase the 
application of agrochemical inputs, crop insurance is not likely to encourage the expansion 
of crop production into new land. The proposed government subsidy for general crop 
insurance is also not likely to induce the shift of production from crops requiring less 
agrochemical inputs to cotton which usually requires more agrochemical inputs.   
Therefore, if the current scenario is not changed dramatically, crop insurance 
subsidies by the government will not lead to significant damage to the environment. In 
order to remedy the potential environment threat of the accumulation of agrofilm in the soil, 
the subsidy policy would be better applied to crop areas where agrofilm is not a necessary 
input. At the same time, the development and adoption of easy-pickup agrofilm and a 
special machine to clear the soil at low costs should be encouraged – the adoption of such 






Further studies should be conducted to investigate the actual changes in agrochemical 
applications, as well as changes in farmers’ welfare, under various insurance terms 
associated with different subsidy schemes. As suggested by this study, the relationship 
between crop insurance and agrochemical application is setting-dependent (i.e., conditional 
on the natural environment and terms stipulated in the insurance policy). Obviously, more 
studies investigating farmers’ behaviors under different circumstances are very important in 
designing appropriate crop insurance programs for different crops under various conditions. 
It is also believed that the validity and/or desirability of government support in crop 
insurance lies in the improved welfare of farmers involved in such insurance programs. The 
farmers’ willingness to pay for various insurance policies is a necessary basis to measure 
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